Abstract-In this paper, error-correcting codes from perfect nonlinear mappings are constructed, and then employed to construct secret sharing schemes. The error-correcting codes obtained in this paper are very good in general, and many of them are optimal or almost optimal. The secret sharing schemes obtained in this paper have two types of access structures. The first type is democratic in the sense that every participant is involved in the same number of minimal-access sets. In the second type of access structures, there are a few dictators who are in every minimal access set, while each of the remaining participants is in the same number of minimal-access sets.
I. INTRODUCTION

S
ECRET sharing schemes were introduced by Blakley [2] and Shamir [22] in 1979. Since then, a number of constructions have been proposed. The relationship between Shamir's secret sharing scheme and the Reed-Solomon codes was pointed out by McEliece and Sarwate in 1981 [19] . Massey described another construction of secret sharing schemes using error-correcting codes in 1993 [17] , [18] . Later, several authors have considered the construction of secret sharing schemes using linear error correcting codes [1] , [11] , [12] , [20] , [21] , [23] . In principle, every linear code gives a secret sharing scheme. However, the following problems are essential.
1. How do we determine the access structure of the secret sharing scheme based on a linear code?
2. How do we construct the underlying linear code so that the corresponding secret sharing scheme has a prescribed access structure, while minimizing the information rate?
Attacking the first problem is more or less equivalent to determining the set of all minimal codewords of the underlying linear code, which is called the covering problem of the linear code. This is a very hard problem for general linear codes, and has been solved only for a few classes of special linear codes.
The second problem depends on solutions to the first problem, and is also a very hard problem in general. So far, no general solution is known. Intuitively, only well structured linear codes give secret sharing schemes with nice access structures. Thus, constructing linear codes with certain properties is one interesting direction in the study of secret sharing schemes.
Highly nonlinear functions are useful in constructing stream ciphers, block ciphers, hash functions, and authentication codes. In this paper, we use perfect nonlinear functions to construct several classes of linear codes and develop tight lower bounds on the minimum distance of the codes. We determine the minimum distance of their dual codes, and analyze the access structures of the secret sharing schemes based on the dual codes. We show that the secret sharing schemes have nice access structures. The error-correcting codes constructed in this paper are very good in general, and many of them are optimal or almost optimal.
II. PERFECT NONLINEAR FUNCTIONS AND THEIR PROPERTIES
Let be a function from an Abelian group of order to another Abelian group of order . is linear if and only if for all . A function is affine if and only if , where is linear and is a constant. Clearly, the zero function is linear. If is a nonzero linear function from to , let . Then is a subgroup of , is a subgroup of , and, denoting by the size of a set , . In the case that is odd and is a power of , the only linear function from to is the zero function, since if , then is even, a contradiction with the fact that is odd; thus, all affine functions are constant functions.
The (Hamming) distance between two functions and from to , denoted by , is defined to be One way of measuring the nonlinearity of a function from to is to use the minimum distance between and all affine functions from to . With this approach the nonlinearity of is defined to be (1) where denotes the set of all affine functions from to . This measure of nonlinearity is related to linear cryptanalysis, but it is not useful in some general cases. For example, as pointed out earlier, in the case is odd and is a power of , this measure makes little sense as there are no nonconstant affine functions from to .
0018-9448/$20.00 © 2005 IEEE A robust measure of the nonlinearity of functions is related to differential cryptanalysis and uses the derivatives . It may be defined by (2) The smaller the value of , the higher the corresponding nonlinearity of (if is linear, then ). In some cases, it is possible to find the exact relation between the two measures on nonlinearity.
It is easily seen that
This lower bound can be considered as an upper bound for the nonlinearity of . For applications in coding theory and cryptography, we wish to find functions with the smallest possible . A function has perfect nonlinearity if . The following lemma and theorem about perfect nonlinear functions were proved in [6] . This inequality and the first and third equations of (4) together give which can be easily written as This proves the lower and upper bounds on . As mentioned before, the bounds are proved similarly for other .
The bounds on follow from those on and the fact that the sum of a function with perfect nonlinearity and any affine function gives another function with perfect nonlinearity.
It will be seen later that the bounds of Theorem 3 can be achieved, and are the basis of the main results of this paper. We define another linear code over GF as GF (7) where and are all the elements of GF . The code is closely related to . We shall use to construct secret sharing schemes in the sequel. Before doing this, we prove some properties of these codes. Similarly, we can prove the following.
III. THE CONSTRUCTIONS OF LINEAR CODES
Theorem 5:
If has perfect nonlinearity, the code of (7) has parameters with Furthermore, for every nonzero weight in , we have
The code may give optimal and almost optimal codes. For example, when , it is a code which is optimal [3] . When , it is a code which is optimal [3] . When , it is an code which is either optimal or almost optimal because the minimum distance of any ternary code with length and dimension is at most [3] . When , it is a code which is either optimal or almost optimal because the minimum distance of any code over GF with length and dimension is at most [3] . The dual code has length and dimension . For our applications, we are interested in the minimum distance of the dual code . We have the following conclusion. 
Without loss of generality, we only need to consider the following two subcases.
• , : In this subcase we have
By the perfect nonlinearity of we have , which is a contradiction.
• : In this case Since , we have (9) which is the same as (10) This implies that by the perfect nonlinearity of , and is contrary to our assumption that . The proof of this theorem is now complete.
Remark:
If and , is possible when is almost perfect nonlinear (see [5] for details). (13) Since is a perfect nonlinear mapping, we obtain that . This is contradictory to the assumption that these 's are pairwise distinct.
Finally, we prove that has a codeword of weight . We first claim that there exist three pairwise distinct elements GF such that . (14) becomes (16) We proved earlier that , , are pairwise distinct. By (16) and the equality , we know that has a codeword of weight . This is contrary to the fact we proved earlier that has no codeword of weight . Hence, . In summary, we proved that , , , , are pairwise distinct. Now it follows from the equation and (14) that has a codeword of weight . Hence, . 2. We now prove that if .
Because or , it can be verified that It then follows from the sphere-packing bound that . Hence, . This completes the proof of this theorem.
A. Connection Between Some Codes and Cyclic Codes With Two Zeros
Let us choose for all . Then the code defined in (6) is cyclic when is a power function, and is, in general, noncyclic otherwise. In this subsection, we point out that the code defined in (6) is the dual of a cyclic code with two zeros when is a power function. Define and . We now consider any integer with and for any . We use and to denote the minimal polynomials over GF of and , respectively. Since for any , is not a Galois conjugate of . Hence, the two polynomials and are not equal. Let denote the cyclic code generated by , which is an ideal of the ring GF . Our task now is to determine the dual code . To this end, we need the following lemma, which is referred to as Delsarte's theorem [9] .
Lemma 8: Let be a linear code of length over GF . Then where GF is the restriction of to GF , and is the GF -code given by
We deduce the following result which may be familiar to some people. For completeness, we also include a proof here. Finally, the conclusion of Lemma 9 follows from Lemma 8. This completes the proof.
Lemma 9 says that our code is equivalent to the dual code of a cyclic code with two zeros when is a power function. It will be shown in the sequel that some perfect nonlinear functions are power functions and some are not power functions. Therefore, some of the codes of (6) obtained from perfect nonlinear functions are certainly noncyclic and thus new.
B. The Codes From
It is straightforward to show that is a perfect nonlinear mapping from GF to itself, where is odd. In this case, the minimum distance and all weights can be determined. The case is treated in [10] .
Theorem 10: Let and . If is even, the code of (6) has parameters and has the following five nonzero weights:
If is odd, the code of (6) has parameters and has the following three nonzero weights:
This theorem shows that the lower bound on the minimum distance of the code given in Theorem 4 can be met, and is thus tight when is even. . We now give a necessary and sufficient condition for to have a codeword of weight . Clearly, this condition is that there are two nonzero elements and in GF and three pairwise distinct elements , , in GF such that (18) for all pairs GF . Equation (18) is equivalent to (19) We now consider the case and show that . In this case, we put . Since , we can choose one GF , and define to be any nonzero element of GF . Then is a solution to (18) and the three coordinates of this vector are pairwise distinct and nonzero. Thus, in the case , has a codeword of weight , and thus minimum distance .
In the case that , it follows from the second part of Theorem 6 that .
Remark: The first part of the conclusion in Theorem 11 may be proved by combining Lemma 9 of this paper and [7, Theorem 3] . But the second part (i.e., if ) cannot be derived from Lemma 9 and [7] . 
i.e., Since , , are pairwise distinct, the coefficient matrix is nonsingular and there do not exist , such that (20) holds. It then follows from Theorem 7 that . The four classes of codes , , , contain the following optimal codes: and the following best codes known: and according to [3] . is a code. Proof: a), c), and d) follow from Theorems 4, 5, and 7, respectively. Part b) follows from the second part of Theorem 6.
C. The Ternary Codes From and
Remark: The conclusion of Part b) in Theorem 13 cannot be proved by combining Lemma 9 of this paper and [7] , because it only proves .
The ternary codes , , , described in Theorem 13 contain a number of optimal codes and are very good in general according to [3] .
Let be odd. It is known that is a planar function from GF to itself [8] , and has thus perfect nonlinearity. This perfect nonlinear function also gives several classes of ternary codes described in the following theorem. From the last equation of (22) we get Thus, the second equation of (22) becomes which is equivalent to Note that , so , . This is contrary to our assumption. Thus, has no codeword of weight . It then follows from Theorem 7 that .
Remark: The conclusion of Part b) in Theorem 15 may be proved by combining Lemma 9 of this paper, [7 
Open Problem 3:
Determine the minimum distance and weight distribution of the two classes of codes and obtained from the perfect nonlinear function .
The ternary codes , , , described in Theorem 15 contain a number of optimal codes and are very good in general according to [3] .
IV. SECRET SHARING SCHEMES FROM THE LINEAR CODES
In this section, we analyze the access structure of the secret sharing schemes based on the duals of the class of linear codes from perfect nonlinear functions constructed earlier.
A. A General Construction of Secret Sharing Schemes From Linear Codes
Let be a generator matrix of an code , i.e., the row vectors of generate the linear subspace . For all the linear codes in this paper no column vector of any generator matrix is the zero vector. There are several ways to use linear codes to construct secret sharing schemes [17] , [19] - [21] . One of them is the following described by Massey [17] .
In the secret sharing scheme based on , the secret is an element of GF and is equally likely to be any element of GF , which is called the secret space, and parties and a dealer are involved. To compute the shares with respect to a secret , the dealer chooses randomly a vector GF such that . If a group of participants can recover the secret by combining their shares, then any group of participants containing this group can also recover the secret. A group of participants is called a minimal access set if they can recover the secret with their shares, any of its proper subgroups cannot do so. Here a proper subgroup has fewer members than this group. Due to these facts, we are only interested in the set of all minimal-access sets. To determine this set, we need the notion of minimal codewords.
The support of a vector GF is defined to be A codeword covers a codeword if the support of contains that of .
If a nonzero codeword covers only its multiples, but no other nonzero codewords, then it is called a minimal codeword.
From Proposition 16 and the preceding discussions, it is clear that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the set of minimal-access sets and the set of minimal codewords of the dual code whose first coordinate is . In the sequel, we shall consider the secret sharing schemes based on the dual codes of these linear codes from perfect nonlinear functions.
It should be noticed that to determine the access structure of the secret sharing scheme, we need to determine only the set of minimal codewords whose first coordinate is , i.e., a subset of the set of all minimal codewords. However, in almost every case we should be able to determine the set of all minimal codewords as long as we can determine the set of minimal codewords whose first coordinate is . The covering problem of a linear code is to determine the set of all its minimal codewords.
The shares for the participants depend on the the selection of the generator matrix of the code . However, by Proposition 16, the selection of does not affect the access structure of the secret sharing scheme. Hence, in the sequel we will call it the secret sharing scheme based on , without mentioning the generator matrix used to compute the shares.
B. The Access Structure of the Secret Sharing Schemes
We described the general construction of secret sharing schemes based on a linear code . Clearly, we have also a secret sharing scheme based on the dual code . Thus, for every given linear code we have two secret sharing schemes. In this and later sections, we consider only the secret sharing schemes based on the dual code of a given linear code. The reader should not be confused about the two secret sharing schemes based on and .
The following describes the access structure of the secret sharing scheme based on the dual code of a given linear code, and is a generalization of the corresponding result in [12] , [23] .
Theorem 17:
Let be an code, and let be its generator matrix. We use to denote the minimum distance of its dual code . If each nonzero codeword of is minimal, then in the secret sharing scheme based on there are altogether minimal-access sets.
• When , the access structure is as follows. If is a multiple of , , then participant must be in every minimal access set. Such a participant is called a dictatorial participant. If is not a multiple of , , then participant must be in out of minimal-access sets.
• When , for any fixed every group of participants is involved in out of minimal-access sets. Proof: We first prove that the total number of minimalaccess sets is . At the very beginning of this section, we assumed that every column vector of any generator matrix is nonzero. Hence, . Thus, the inner product takes on each element of GF exactly times when ranges over all elements of GF . Hence, there are altogether codewords in whose first coordinator is nonzero. Since each nonzero codeword is minimal, a codeword covers another one if and only if they are multiples of each other. Hence, the total number of minimal codewords is , which is the number of minimal-access sets.
Suppose that . We determine the access structure. The minimum distance of the code gives the lower bound for the cardinality of any minimal access set, while the minimum distance of the dual code indicates the extent of democracy of the secret sharing scheme. However, there is a tradeoff between the two parameters, i.e., . The equality is achieved if is maximum-distance separable (MDS).
In view of Theorem 17, it is an interesting problem to construct codes where each nonzero codeword is minimal. Such a linear code gives a secret sharing scheme with the interesting access structure described in Theorem 17.
If the weights of a linear code are close enough to each other, then each nonzero codeword of the code is minimal, as described by the following theorem.
Theorem 18: [23] , [12] In an code , let and be the minimum and maximum nonzero weights, respectively. If then each nonzero codeword of is minimal.
C. Extending a Secret Sharing Scheme With a Small Secret Space
Given a secret sharing scheme in which the secret space is small, one could extend it into a secret sharing scheme where the secret space is for any positive integer . The extension is very simple and as follows.
For a chosen integer , the new secret space is . Each secret in the new secret space is a sequence of length , where each . In the extended scheme we use the original secret sharing scheme to share this secret component by component. For each component , a share component corresponding to is computed using the original secret sharing scheme. Hence, each participant will get a sequence of share components. The secret will be recovered by recovering each one by one using the original secret sharing scheme when a group of participants meet together with their shares.
The information rate of the extended scheme is the same as the original secret sharing scheme. Thus, secret sharing schemes with a small secret space are as useful as those with large secret spaces. In the secret sharing schemes described in the sequel, the secret space is GF . Here could be or a power of any odd prime. Due to the extension given above, such schemes are all useful. The information rate of all the secret sharing schemes presented in this paper is , the best possible.
D. Secret Sharing Schemes Based on the Duals of the Linear Codes From Perfect Nonlinear Functions
Having described the general construction of secret sharing schemes based on error correcting codes and their extensions, we now use the duals of these linear codes from perfect nonlinear functions to construct secret sharing schemes and analyze their access structures.
For the code of Theorem 4, we have the following general result.
Theorem 19:
Let be the code over GF of Theorem 4, and let denote a generator matrix of . If , then in the secret sharing scheme based on , the total number of participants is , and there are altogether minimal-access sets.
• When , the access structure is as follows. If is a multiple of , , then participant must be in every minimal access set. If is not a multiple of , , then participant must be in out of minimal-access sets.
• When , for any fixed every group of participants is involved in out of minimal-access sets. Proof: As before, let and denote the minimum and maximum nonzero weights in , respectively. By Theorem 4 we have because . It follows from Theorem 18 that every codeword in is minimal. The conclusions of this theorem then follow from Theorem 17.
This theorem gives the access structure of the secret sharing scheme based on whose dual is from any perfect nonlinear function under the condition . If this condition is not satisfied, the covering problem for the code is still open and so is the access structure of the secret sharing scheme based on . On the other hand, this condition is derived from the lower and upper bounds on the weights in given in Theorem 4. If all the weights in can be determined, it is possible to relax this condition to some extent so that the access structure can still be determined.
Open Problem 4:
Let be the code over GF of Theorem 4. Determine the access structure of the secret sharing scheme based on for the case that .
As seen earlier, it is possible that . In this case, some participants must be involved in every minimal-access set and thus, in every access set. This means that these participants must be involved in order to recover a secret. These participants are thus called dictatorial participants. When , every participant is involved in the same number of minimal-access sets. In this case, the secret sharing scheme is called democratic. The minimum distance indicates the extent of democracy of the secret sharing scheme. To give a better description of the access structure, we need to determine .
In the following, we shall give a detailed description of the access structure of the secret sharing schemes based on several specific classes of codes constructed in Section III.
Theorem 20:
Let be the code of Theorem 10. If , then in the secret sharing scheme based on , the total number of participants is and there are altogether minimal-access sets.
• When , every participant is involved in out of minimal-access sets.
• When , for any fixed every group of participants is involved in out of minimal-access sets. Proof: Similar to the proof of Theorem 19, it can be proved that every codeword of is minimal if . The conclusions then follow from Theorems 17 and 11.
Open Problem 5:
Let be the code of Theorem 10. Determine the access structure of the secret sharing scheme based on for .
Theorem 21: Let be the ternary code from the perfect nonlinear function . If , then in the secret sharing scheme based on , the total number of participants is , and there are altogether minimal-access sets. For any fixed , every group of participants is involved in out of minimal-access sets.
Proof: The conclusions follow from Theorem 13 and its proof as well as Theorem 19.
The condition in Theorem 21 is necessary for the access structure of the secret sharing scheme to be democratic. The following example shows the necessity. The fourth participant is involved in seven of the minimal-access sets, while each of the remaining participants is involved in eight of the minimal-access sets. Hence, the secret sharing scheme is not democratic when the condition is not satisfied. , then in the secret sharing scheme based on , the total number of participants is , and there are altogether minimal-access sets. In addition, every participant is involved in out of minimal-access sets.
In particular, if , for any fixed every group of participants is involved in out of minimal-access sets.
Proof: The conclusions follow from Theorems 19 and 15.
Open Problem 6: Let , and let be the code over GF from the perfect nonlinear function . Determine the access structure of the secret sharing scheme based on for the case .
V. CODES FROM ANOTHER CLASS OF PERFECT NONLINEAR FUNCTIONS AND THEIR SECRET SHARING SCHEMES
Section III gives a general construction of two types of related codes using perfect nonlinear mappings from GF to GF , and Section IV describes the secret sharing schemes based on their dual codes. In this section, we use a class of perfect nonlinear mappings from GF to GF to construct a class of three-weight codes and describe the access structure of the secret sharing schemes based on their dual codes.
Let GF , and let denote the trace function from GF to GF in this section. Define the function Let GF Then any given set of GF defines the following vector:
We now define the following linear code:
GF
To determine the weight distribution of the code , we prove the following lemma. In the cases of and , the code has parameters among which the first two are optimal, and the last one is the best code known according to [3] . In the case , the code has the same weights as the Kasami code [14] . But it is an open problem whether they are equivalent. However, they are not among the best codes known when , although they are good codes. We are interested only in for our secret sharing purpose.
The code is constructed using a class of perfect nonlinear functions where , and a class of linear functions
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The main objectives of this paper are to construct good linear codes and derive secret sharing schemes based on them with nice access structures. The linear codes presented in this paper do contain many optimal and almost optimal codes, as shown in some of the previous sections. If a perfect nonlinear function from GF to itself satisfies the two simple conditions in Theorem 6, then the ternary code has parameters and is thus optimal due to the sphere-packing bound. We pointed out in Section III-A that when is a power function, the code is equivalent to the dual of a cyclic code with two zeros. In this case, the code and its dual are not new. But our contribution to the study of these codes is the very tight lower bounds on the minimum distance of and described in Theorems 4 and 5. As mentioned earlier, some perfect nonlinear functions are not power functions. In this case, the code is not cyclic and could be new. Note that our constructions of the codes and are generic. As long as we discover new perfect nonlinear functions, we will obtain new linear codes.
Here we inform that Ding and Yuan [13] have just discoverd a new family of perfect nonlinear functions which are discribed in the following proposition.
Proposition 31: (Ding and Yuan [13] ) For any GF is a perfect nonlinear function from GF to GF , where is odd.
A -element subset of a finite Abelian group of order is called a -difference set in provided that the multiset contains each nonidentity element of exactly times. A difference set in an additive group is called a skew difference set (or antisymmetric difference set) if and only if is the disjoint union of , , and . Ding and Yuan [13] have also proved the following.
Proposition 32: (Ding and Yuan [13] ) Let be odd, and GF . The set is a skew difference set in the Abelian group GF .
The new family of perfect nonlinear functions of Proposition 31 yields more linear codes within the generic construction of this paper. In addition, the difference set property given in Proposition 32 may be used to prove more properties of the linear codes.
The secret sharing schemes based on the dual codes of the error-correcting codes from perfect nonlinear functions have two types of access structures. The first type is democratic, and the second type has a few dictatorial participants. Both types could be useful in applications.
Regarding the linear codes and the secret sharing schemes we proposed seven open problems. It would be nice if advances on these open problems could be made. We invite the reader to attack these open problems.
Finally, we mention functions from GF to GF with optimal nonlinearity were used to construct binary codes in [5] and [4] , where good and optimal binary codes were obtained.
